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NOTES
quently, when proximate cause is used in a jury trial, a jury
can define the limits of a defendant's liability; under a duty-risk
approach, however, the judge must assume this responsibility.
If proximate cause were completely abandoned in favor of duty-
risk, it appears that a jury would be precluded from partici-
pating in the process of defining the limits of a defendant's
liability. However, there may be cases in which the judge de-
sires jury participation in the process. This possibility seems to
warrant the retention of proximate cause in negligence cases,
and thereby affords a proper vehicle to present the issue to the
jury.
Nevertheless, a duty-risk approach has its advantages. By
openly resorting to judicial or legislative policy, it affords the
court greater flexibility than the use of proximate cause in the
decision-making process. Unlike the case with proximate cause,
it also directs the readers of judicial decisions to the factors that
motivated the court in making its decision.24 It should be noted,
however, that a movement toward a duty-risk approach does not
guarantee a solution to the problems of liability, but merely
poises it for solution.
Danny Lirette
VOIR DnRE EXAMINATION AS TO FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF LAW
On voir dire examination in a criminal prosecution, defense
counsel sought to ask each prospective juror whether he could
afford the defendant his legal presumption of innocence, and
whether he would be affected by defendant's refusal to testify.
The trial judge refused to allow the questions because he had
previously instructed the entire panel as to these and other fun-
damental rules of law applicable in all criminal cases. He al-
lowed only a general question as to whether the juror would
apply the law as instructed by the court. The Louisiana supreme
court reversed and held, since the preliminary instructions were
24. Ordinarily, courts do not openly rely on judicial or legislative policy
as motivating factors in decisions under proximate cause. However, some
writers have asserted that the underlying factors in most proximate cause
decisions were judicial and/or legislative policy, thus making it difficult to
determine the criteria which the court did use in making its decision. See




not given in the presence of defense counsel,' the voir dire ex-
amination had been too severely restricted. State v. Crittle, 268
So.2d 604 (La. 1972).
The right to voir dire examination is an implementation of
the defendant's right to an impartial jury,2 and enables him to
effectively exercise his constitutionally guaranteed peremptory
challenges. 3 The Louisiana supreme court has held that the "de-
fendant in a criminal prosecution is entitled to make reasonable
and pertinent inquiries of the prospective juror so that he may
exercise intelligently and wisely his right of peremptory chal-
lenge .... -"4 In addition, the Code of Criminal Procedure gives
the accused the right to challenge a juror for cause. 5 Under the
1928 code, jurors could be challenged for cause because they (1)
lacked a legal qualification, such as age or literacy; (2) were
not impartial; (3) had some relationship with the accused or
victim; or (4) served on a previous jury dealing with the case.8
The 1966 code incorporates these grounds and adds that a juror
may be challenged for cause if he "will not accept the law as
given to him by the court . . . . 7 The former code also pro-
vided that the purpose of voir dire examination was "to ascer-
tain the qualifications of the juror . . . ." and that the examina-
tion was to be conducted "in the manner as ... [then] pro-
vided by existing law."8 However, there was no existing law.9
The 1966 code remedied this oversight by providing that the
examination should be within the discretion of the court.'0
It is clearly established in all jurisdictions that the extent
of voir dire examination is within the sound discretion of the
1. The trial judge's practice was to give the preliminary Instruction as
to fundamental rules of law to the entire panel of jurors on Monday morning,
the jurors' first day in court. This case was tried three days later, and thus
neither defendant nor his counsel were present during the instruction.
2. LA. CONST. art. I, § 9: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right to a speedy trial by an impartial jury ....
3. Id. § 10: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall . . . have
the right to challenge jurors peremptorily, the number of challenges to be
fixed by law."
4. State v. Hills, 241 La. 345, 395, 129 So.2d 12, 31 (1961).
5. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 797.
6. La. Code Crim. P. arts 350, 351 (1928).
7. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 797. Note that article 798 gives the state the
right to challenge for cause if the juror is biased against the enforcement
of the statute in question, has scruples against capital punishment, or would
not convict on circumstantial evidence.
8. La. Code Crim. P. arts. 349, 357 (1928).
9. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 786, comment (a).
10. Id. art. 786.
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trial court; rulings will not be reversed on appeal unless there
has been clear abuse prejudicial to the defendant." In this re-
gard, the United States Supreme Court has held that the court
has "broad discretion" on voir dire, restricted only by "essential
demands of fairness."'1 2 The courts of the various jurisdictions
disagree' 8 on the specific issues involved in Crittle, the ques-
tioning of jurors concerning fundamental legal principles.
Although Louisiana cases have been unclear in this area,
the Louisiana supreme court has consistently found no abuse in
the trial judge disallowing certain categories of questions. Those
categories include confusing or ambiguous questions ;14 questions
tending to commit jurors in advance 15 or concerning evidence
which may be introduced at trial;1 those containing lengthy
statements of particular areas of the law; 17 and those concerning
a juror's knowledge or opinion of the law.'8
State v. Hills'9 is the leading case establishing broad guide-
11. 5 R. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE 1996 (1957);
see cases cited in note 13 infra. For a more complete listing of cases, see
genera ly Annot., 54 A.L.R.2d 1204, 1207 n.15 (1957).
12. Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 310 (1931).
13. Federal courts of appeal find no abuse of the trial court's discretion
in a refusal to allow such questions. United States v. Gillette, 383 F.2d 843
(2d Cir. 1967); Grandsinger v. United States, 332 F.2d 80 (10th Cir. 1964);
Stone v. United States, 324 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1963). The Maryland court of
appeals finds it "inappropriate" to question jurors on the principles of
burden of proof and presumption of innocence. Twining v. State, 234 Md.
97, 100, 198 A.2d 291, 293 (1964). The Idaho supreme court uses a broader
prohibition, holding that the accused has no right to question the jurors
concerning their willingness to follow the law as given by the court. State
v. Bitz, 93 Idaho 239, 460 P.2d 374 (1969). On the other hand, the California
supreme court has stated in dictum that refusal to allow questions relating
to willingness to apply principles of law might constitute a denial of "rea-
sonable examination" guaranteed by California law. People v. Love, 53 Cal.
2d 843, 852, 350 P.2d 705, 710 (1960). The Texas court of criminal appeals
found no abuse when a trial judge limited questioning to these issues, be-
cause the same questions had already been allowed. Grizzell v. State, 164
Tex. Crim. 362, 298 S.W.2d 816 (1956). In Illinois the defendant has the right
in voir dire examinations to advise jurors on the presumption of Innocence
and to determine whether they will give the defendant that presumption.
People v. Redola, 300 Ill. 392, 133 N.E. 292 (1921).
14. State v. Peltier, 229 La. 745, 86 So.2d 693 (1956); State v. Sanford,
218 La. 38, 48 So.2d 272 (1950).
15. State v. Harper, 260 La. 715, 257 So.2d 381 (1972); State v. Smith, 216
La. 1041, 45 So.2d 617 (1950).
16. State v. Square, 257 La. 743, 244 So.2d 200 (1971); State v. Bickham,
236 La. 244, 107 So.2d 458 (1958).
17. State v. Schoonover, 252 La. 311, 211 So.2d 273 (1968); State v. Biek-
ham, 236 La. 244, 107 So.2d 458 (1958).
18. State v. Dreher, 166 La. 924, 118 So. 85 (1928); State v. Webb, 156
La. 952, 101 So. 338 (1924); State v. Willie, 130 La. 454, 58 So. 147 (1912).
19. 241 La. 345, 129 So.2d 12 (1960) (questions concerning racial preju-
dices).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
lines on the extent of voir dire examination. The supreme court
held that in order to secure the constitutional right of an im-
partial jury and intelligent use of peremptory challenges, as
well as to establish grounds to challenge for cause, the trial
judge should allow counsel "a wide latitude . . . in examining
jurors on their voir dire."0 The court added that
"the scope of the inquiry is best governed by a liberal dis-
cretion on the part of the Court so that if there is any like-
lihood that some prejudice is in the juror's mind which will
even subconsciously affect his decision, this may be un-
covered."2 '
While this may be a valid general rule, there is inconsistency
in the few Louisiana cases dealing directly with the issue in
Crittle. As early as 1902, the supreme court held that questions
as to a juror's willingness to give the defendant a reasonable
doubt "might" be allowed, but only with a proper explanation
of the term by counsel or the court.2 2 In a more recent case,
State v. Peltier,23 the supreme court affirmed a trial judge's dis-
allowal of this type question, finding the specific question pro-
pounded ambiguous and confusing. The court added, however,
that assuming the questions were clearly phrased, the defendant
could show no prejudice since other similar questions were al-
lowed. Furthermore, the trial judge had stated that "the court
has permitted and will permit counsel to examine the prospec-
tive jurors on the law of burden of proof, reasonable doubt and
presumption of innocence. '24 In State v. Green,2 5 the court up-
held the right of the prosecutor to define reasonable doubt and
to ask a juror whether he could accept and apply this definition
if so instructed by the court. Similarly, the court has upheld
counsel's right to determine the attitudes of prospective jurors
as to the plea of self-defense,2 6 imposition of capital punish-
ment,27 and the returning of qualified verdicts in capital cases.2
In contrast is State v. Richey,29 an earlier case appealed from
20. Id. at 396, 129 So.2d at 31.
21. Id.
22. State v. Perioux, 107 La. 601, 604, 31 So. 1016, 1017 (1902).
23. 229 La. 745, 86 So.2d 693 (1956).
24. Id. at 752, 86 So.2d at 696.
25. 244 La. 80, 150 So.2d 571 (1963).
26. State v. Caldwell, 251 La. 780, 783, 206 So.2d 492, 494 (1968).
27. State v. Crook, 253 La. 961, 221 So.2d 473 (1969).
28. State v. Newton, 241 La. 261, 128 So.2d 651 (1961).
29. 258 La. 1094, 249 So.2d 143 (1971).
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the same court as Crittle. The supreme court found no abuse in
Richey of the trial court's discretion in refusing to allow any
questions relating to presumption of innocence, reasonable
doubt, or any other question concerning rules of law. In his per
curiam, quoted at length by the supreme court, the trial judge
complained of the general abuse of voir dire examinations in
his court by attorneys who questioned jurors extensively as to
their knowledge of pertinent law and attempted to commit the
jurors in advance. Emphasizing the wide discretion of the trial
court, the supreme court found this a reasonable basis for the
limitation imposed. The court noted that the trial judge later
instructed the jury as to all applicable law, and that the defen-
dant could not show that he was forced to accept an undesirable
juror nor that he had suffered any prejudice by the ruling. In a
significant limitation on the ruling, however, the court added that
"[w]hether the questions propounded would be improper in
every criminal case, we are not called upon to say."' 0
Finding distinguishable facts and circumstances, the court
relied upon this limitation in deciding the instant case. Defen-
dant's counsel pointed out that neither he nor the defendant
were present during the judge's preliminary instruction to all
prospective jurors given three days before the voir dire examina-
tion. The supreme court quoted from State v. Hills' to establish
that the judge should be liberal in his discretion so that any
prejudice may be discovered and challenges used effectively.
After distinguishing Richey8 from the instant case, the court
held:
"Under the present facts and circumstances surrounding
defense counsel's questioning of prospective jurors, we find
that the trial judge restricted him too severely and too nar-
rowly. Counsel was not present in court on the Monday
prior to the instant trial when the prospective jury panel
was instructed; there was no requirement that he be present.
The jury panel was not reinstructed in counsel's presence.
Counsel was interrupted at the inception of these proceed-
ings; he was not allowed to try this case to the best of his
ability. The trial judge misinterpreted our ruling in Richey;
30. Id. at 1118, 249 So.2d at 152.
31. 241 La. 345, 129 So.2d 12 (1960). See text accompanying notes 19-21
supra.
32. 258 La. 1094, 249 So.2d 143 (1971).
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he should have permitted defense counsel to pursue the
questioning quoted supra, or questioned and/or instructed
the jurors himself."3
While Crittle seems correct in light of earlier decisions, it is
difficult to reconcile it with Richey, the most recent case on
point. The court distinguished Richey by the fact that counsel
was not present during the preliminary instruction. Yet in
Richey, there is no reference to a preliminary instruction having
been given. In a similar case8 4 the trial judge who decided both
Richey and Crittle stated that he adopted the procedure of giving
preliminary instructions subsequent to Richey. Thus, since no
preliminary instruction was given, Richey would seem to indicate
that no preliminary instruction is needed in order to uphold
the trial judge's disallowal of this line of questioning. If this
instruction is not needed, then how can it be relevant that
counsel was not present during this instruction in Critte?85
Under the procedure adopted in Crittle, the defendant is given
the added protection of having the jury instructed in these pre-
liminary rules of law prior to trial; yet by adding this protection
the trial judge subjects himself to reversal if defense counsel is
not present.
To compound the confusion, in two other cases also from
the same judicial district decided the same day as Crittle, the
supreme court upheld the practice which was the subject of
reversal in Crittle. In State v. Shepherd,86 counsel made no issue
of being absent during the preliminary instruction, the court
simply assuming he was present. In State v. Bell,7 there was no
mention of a preliminary instruction having been given, and the
court relied on the fact that the judge's ultimate charge to the
jury was adequate.
Crittle seems to be a more correct interpretation of the Code
33. State v. Crittle, 268 So.2d 604, 608 (La. 1972).
34. State v. Sheppard, 268 So.2d 590 (La. 1972).
35. Justice Barham, in a dissenting opinion in Sheppard, 268 So.2d 590,
599 (La. 1972), argues that this preliminary instruction is part of the jury
selection process and that Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article
831 requires the presence of the accused. However, the majority opinion
does not discuss the point.
36. 268 So.2d 590 (La. 1972).
37. 268 So.2d 610 (La. 1972).
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of Criminal Procedure. 8 The redactors intended to liberalize voir
dire examinations and to establish a new ground for challenges
for cause. Yet under Richey the court's interpretation of the new
provisions is even more restrictive than its earlier interpretations
of the old code.89 Thus the new ground for challenge becomes
useless.
Furthermore, Crittle seems to provide a more realistic policy.
Can a judge's questioning of an entire panel of jurors be mean-
ingful in determining prejudice? What juror would step forward
and say that he could not give the defendant the legal rights
he is entitled to have? This kind of prejudice is often hidden,
even to the juror himself, and can only be determined by a
probing examination. The supreme court recognized this in
State v. Oliphant,4 0 where it found that the trial court erred in
not dismissing a juror for cause when the juror demonstrated
predispositions against the presumption of innocence under ex-
amination, even though the juror told the judge he would afford
the defendant that presumption.
It is suggested that the abuses complained of in Richey can
be prevented; at the same time, a reasonable and pertinent ex-
amination of jurors can be held in order to determine their
attitude with regard to fundamental rules of law. Crittle appears
to be a correct interpretation of the law and jurisprudence and
properly implements the defendant's right to an impartial jury.
In its further consideration of this point, the supreme court
38. It is significant to note that Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure
article 786, comment (d) (examination of jurors) cites State v. Hills, 241
La. 345, 129 So.2d 12 (1961), as authority for a court allowing a wide scope
of examination on voir dire. Article 797, comment (d), referring to article
797 (4) (juror can be challenged for cause for refusing to accept the law as
given by the court), states that this new ground for challenge for cause
is a codification of the jurisprudence, citing State v. Oliphant, 220 La. 489,
56 So.2d 846 (1952), as authority. In that case extensive examination of
jurors was allowed by the trial court as to jurors' willingness to apply the
law as given on presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt, and burden
or proof. Significant also is comment (b), article 799 (giving number of
peremptory challenges), where State v. Hills, 241 La. 345, 129 So.2d 12 (1961),
and State v. Henry, 196 La. 217, 198 So. 910 (1940), are cited as authority
for the state and the defendant having the right to cross-examine jurors
to determine grounds for challenge for cause and to use peremptory chal-
lenges effectively. In Henry, the supreme court reversed a trial judge's
refusal to allow defense counsel to ask a prospective juror whether he could
return a qualified verdict in a capital case.
39. See text accompanying notes 19-25, 28 supra.
40. 220 La. 489, 56 So.2d 846 (1952).
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hopefully will abandon Richey and its progeny 41 and adopt the
position set forth in Crittle.
Byron F. Martin III
PRETRIAL MENTAL COMMITMENT OF THE AccusED
Defendant, a twenty-seven year old, mentally deficient deaf
mute, blind in one eye and unable to read, write or otherwise
communicate, was charged with two separate robberies.1 Upon
receipt of not-guilty pleas, the trial court initiated competency
procedures.2 At a subsequent hearing, the court found the ac-
cused incapable of standing trial and ordered commitment to a
state mental institution until he attained competency. Defendant
moved for new trial, challenging Indiana's commitment criteria
as violating due process and equal protection of the law and sub-
jecting him to cruel and unusual punishment. The trial court
denied the motion, and the Indiana supreme court affirmed8 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed and
unanimously held that by subjecting the accused to more liberal
commitment standards and more stringent criteria for release
than applied in civil commitment proceedings, the state had de-
prived defendant of equal protection of the law; and that the
indefinite commitment of an accused solely because of his inca-
pacity to stand trial violated due process of law. Jackson v. Indi-
ana, 92 S. Ct. 1845 (1972).
The concept of mental capacity to stand trial was of early
common law origin,4 where a sound mind was said to be needed
41. Specifically, State v. Bell, 268 So.2d 610 (La. 1972); State v. Sheppard,
268 So.2d 590 (La. 1972).
1. "The first involved property (a purse and its contents) of the value
of four dollars. The second concerned five dollars in money." Jackson v.
State, 92 S. Ct. 1845, 1848 (1972).
2. The procedures were pursuant to BURNS' IND. STAT. ANN. § 9-1706a
(now IND. CODE § 35-5-3-2 (Supp. 1971)).
3. Jackson v. State, 253 Ind. 487, 255 N.E.2d 515 (1970).
4. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 1723-78, at 24
(Dawsons ed. 1966): "Al[s]o, if a man in his [sound memory commits a
capital offense, and before arraignment for it, he becomes mad, he ought
not to be arraigned for it; becau[s]e he is not able to plead to it with that
advice and caution that he ought. And if, after he has pleaded, the
pri[sjoner becomes mad, he shall not be tried; for how can he make his
defense?" For an early history of incompetency proceedings, see Youtsey v.
United States, 97 F. 937 (6th Cir. 1899). See generally the Foreword to T.
SZAsz, THE MANUFACTURE OF MADNESS at xix (1970).
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